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I. NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Plaintiff-respondent Brickyard Office Associates, Ltd. 
("Brickyard"), brought its action to quiet title to the subject 
real property and for damages caused by defendant's refusal to 
remove a cloud on the title created by a "notice of interest" 
recorded by defendant. Defendant-appellant Mackintosh 
("Mackintosh") counterclaimed seeking money damages from 
plaintiff based on an alleged oral agreement with his former 
employer Machan-Hampshire Properties, Inc. (the "Corporation"). 
In response to Brickyard's motion for Summary 
Judgment, Judge Noel ruled that Mackintosh's alleged interest 
in the real property was barred by the Statute of Frauds and 
therefore the "Notice of Interest" filed by Mackintosh was null 
and void. 
Judge Noel further ruled that Mackintosh had no claim 
against Brickyard arising out of an alleged oral agreement with 
his former corporate employer. 
Contrary to Mackintosh's assertion, Jodge Noel did not 
sign the Order and Judgment to which defendant objected. 
Rather, after defendant's objection, counsel for both parties 
collaborated to prepare a new proposed order and judgment. The 
Order and Judgment signed by Judge Noel was approved as to form 
by George Fadel, Attorney for Defendant [R.454-459]. Addendum, 
Exhibit "A". 
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II. ISSUES 
I. 
Whether the trial court correctly ruled that an oral 
agreement, for which there is no subscribed memorandum/ and by 
which Mackintosh claimed an interest in real property standing 
in the name of Brickyard Office Associates/ Ltd., is barred by 
the Statute of Frauds. 
II. 
Whether the trial court correctly ruled that 
Mackintosh can have no claim, against Brickyard Office 
Associates/ Ltd./ a limited partnership, arising out of an 
alleged contract between Mackintosh and his former corporate 
employer, Machan-Hampshire Properties, Inc. 
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III. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff-respondent Brickyard Office Associates is a 
Utah limited partnership. Owens Affidavit dated October 31, 
1986, 1f 2 [R. 248], Addendum Exhibit MB". Brickyard has two 
general partners, (1) the Machan Family limited partnership; 
(2) the Hampshire Family limited partnership and one limited 
partner, Hud Leach. Owens Affidavit dated, If 2. [R.248-249], 
Addendum Exhibit HBM. These three and only these three have 
ever been partners in Brickyard. Owens Affidavit, 1f 2 [R.249], 
Addendum Exhibit "B". 
Defendant-appellant Dean A. Mackintosh was an employee 
of Machan-Hampshire Properties, Inc., a corporation engaged in 
the business of developing and marketing commercial real estate. 
The corporation was owned by several individuals 
including Mackintosh who owned ten percent of the corporation's 
stock. Mackintosh deposition, p. 34 [R5.ll], Addendum, Exhibit 
"C". At the time of his resignation Mackintosh was slated to 
become president of the corporation. Mackintosh deposition, p. 
68 [R.511], Addendum Exhibit "C". 
At the end of each year, a meeting was held with each 
employee of the corporation, at which time bonuses for the 
prior year's service were granted and discussions were held 
respecting potential bonuses for the upcoming year. Mackintosh 
deposition, pp. 18-19 [R.511], Addendum Exhibit "C". 
The agreement which Mackintosh alleged supposedly 
-4-
arose out of one of these potential bonus discussions with his 
employers at Machan-Hampshire Properties, Inc. Mackintosh 
deposition, pp. 18 and 31. [R.511], Addendum Exhibit "C". 
On January 4, 1984, Mackintosh filed a "Notice of 
Interest" which clouded Brickyard's title to a parcel of real 
property known as the Brickyard Office Tower. In that Notice 
of Interest Mackintosh stated "the undersigned does hereby 
assert and claim an interest in that parcel of real property 
located at 1245 East Brickyard Road, Salt Lake City, Utah . . . 
said interest arises by and through an agreement entered into 
by and between the undersigned and the owners of said parcel." 
(Legal description omitted). [R.7], Addendum Exhibit "D". 
Mackintosh did not have an agreement with Brickyard. 
Mackintosh, in his deposition, refers to three conversations, 
one with John R. Hampshire and two with Gary L. Machan, both 
officers of Machan-Hampshire Properties, Inc. He contends the 
three conversations created an agreement giving him an interest 
in the property. All three conversations occurred while 
Mackintosh was employed by Machan-Hampshire Properties, Inc. 
and arose in the context of that employment. The last 
conversation was in December 1982. Mackintosh deposition, pp. 
30-31, 41, and 42 [R.511], Addendum Exhibit "C". 
There are no other conversations out of which the 
contract is alleged to have arisen. Mackintosh deposition, p. 
82 [R.511], Addendum Exhibit "C". 
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No partnership was ever formed. Mackintosh 
deposition, p. 116 [R.511], Addendum Exhibit HCH. 
Mackintosh had no dealings with Brickyard Office 
Associates. Brickyard Office Associates did not exist until 
September 20, 1983, Owens affidavit at 1f 2 [R.248], Addendum 
Exhibit "B", nearly a year after the last of the alleged 
conversations between Mackintosh and his former employer. 
Mackintosh deposition, pp. 41, 42 [R.511], Addendum Exhibit MC". 
Defendant-appellant is not a limited partner of 
Brickyard Office Associates, Ltd. Mackintosh deposition, pp. 
86, 89, 116, 140 [R.511], Addendum Exhibit "C". 
There is no signed memorandum reflecting the alleged 
oral agreement. Mackintosh deposition, pp. 81, 128-129 
[R.511], Addendum Exhibit "C". 
IV, SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In Utah an oral partnership agreement by which one 
obtains an interest in real property standing in the name of 
another is barred by the Statute of Frauds. Peterson v. 
Hendricks, 524 P.2d 321 (Utah 1974); Guinand v. Walton, 450 
P.2d 467 (Utah 1969) Later appeal, 480 P.2d 137 (Utah 1971). 
Even in those states that recognize an exception to 
the Statute of Frauds for partnership agreements to deal in 
real estate and share in the profits, the exception does not 
apply to an aqreement by which one obtains an interest in the 
-6-
property as opposed to a mere interest in profits from real 
estate speculation. Johnson v. Gilbert. 621 P.2d 916 (Ariz. 
App. 1980); Plummer v. Foqlev, 363 P.2d 238, 241 (Okla. 1961). 
Mackintosh asserted in the court below that he claimed 
an oral agreement by which he was to have an interest in land 
standing in the name of his corporate employer, 
Machan-Hampshire Properties, Inc. The court correctly ruled 
that the agreement, if it existed, was barred by the Statute of 
Frauds. 
The court further correctly ruled that the alleged 
oral agreement between Mackintosh and his former corporate 
employer could give rise to no claim against Brickyard, a 
limited partnership. 
V, ARGUMENT 
A. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN RULING THAT THE 
STATUTE OF FRAUDS BARS MACKINTOSH'S ALLEGED 
INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY. 
The Statute of Frauds protects certain matters of 
great importance involving real estate against fraud and 
perjuries. Guinand v. Walton, 450 P.2d 467, 469 (Utah 1969). 
Later appeal 480 P.2d 137 (1971). 
There is no subscribed memorandum sufficient to 
meet the Statute of Frauds requirement relating to Mackintosh's 
purported interest. Mackintosh deposition, pp. 80, 81 [R.511], 
Addendum Exhibit "C". Therefore, the trial court correctly 
ruled that the claimed interest in the property is barred. 
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1. Utah Does Not Follow The So-Called 
"Majority Rule". Under Utah law. An Oral 
Agreement To Convey A Partnership Interest 
In Land Falls Within The Statute Of Frauds. 
Mackintosh begins his argument by citing an 
A.L.R. annotation in support of the so-called "majority rule" 
that a partnership agreement to deal in profits from real 
estate need not comply with the Statute of Frauds in order to 
be enforceable. The court need not be concerned with 
determining what is or is not the majority rule, however, since 
the Utah Supreme Court has shown, in at least two rulings, that 
Utah does not follow this so-called majority rule. 
The Utah Statute of Frauds, like that of 
neighboring states, prohibits creation of an estate or interest 
in land, absent a signed deed or conveyance in writing. Utah 
Code Ann. § 25-5-1, Addendum Exhibit "E". Unlike the statute 
in most states, however, the Utah statute goes further and 
prohibits the creation of contracts concerning or Hin any 
manner relating to" real property without a signed deed or 
conveyance. 
Given the broad scope of the Utah Statute, 
an agreement to create a partnership to own real estate is 
unenforceable unless a memorandum sufficient to meet the 
Statute of Frauds exists. Peterson v. Hendricks, 524 P.2d 321 
(Utah 1974); Guinand v. Walton. 450 P.2d 467 (Utah 1969). 
Later appeal 480 P.2d 137 (Utah 1971). 
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In Peterson the parties formed a joint 
venture to develop a mine. If the development were successful, 
they agreed to form a company in which each would have a 
one-half interest. When no company was formed, plaintiff filed 
suit. The Supreme Court held that signed letters exchanged 
between the parties constituted a sufficient memorandum of a 
joint venture, without which the agreement would have been 
barred by the Statute of Frauds. 524 P.2d .at. 322. 
Justice Henriod's concurrence suggested that 
the court might follow the so-called "majority rule" and 
thereby avoid the Statute of Frauds altogether. The court 
rejected this short-cut to decision, however, and based its 
decision on the more difficult ground that the letters 
constituted a sufficient memorandum. Thus, the Utah Supreme 
Court has chosen not to follow the "majority rule" now urged by 
Mackintosh. 
The material dissimilarity between Peterson 
and the facts claimed by Mackintosh is that there is no signed 
memorandum sufficient to meet the Statute of Frauds with 
respect to Mackintosh's claimed interest. Unlike the plaintiff 
in Peterson, Mackintosh does not have a signed memorandum which 
meets the statutory requirements. 
Similarly, the Guinand case illustrates that 
Mackintosh's claimed interest is unenforceable under Utah law. 
In Guinand, an employee of a real estate partnership, was given 
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a ten percent ownership in the partnership in payment of 
services rendered. The Supreme Court of Utah held that a 
letter signed by the partnership's general partners was 
sufficient to meet the Statute of Frauds requirement that a 
conveyance of an interest in a partnership, the assets of which 
consist of real estate, be in writing subscribed by the party 
being charged. 450 P.2d at. 469. 
Again the material distinction between 
Mackintosh's version of the facts and Guinand is Mackintosh's 
lack of a memorandum with which to meet the Statute of Frauds. 
In Utah, an agreement by which one obtains 
an interest in a partnership to own real property is not 
enforceable unless the Statute of Frauds is complied with. 
Since Mackintosh does not have a signed memorandum, Judge Noel 
correctly ruled that his claimed interest fails. 
2. Because Mackintosh Claims His Alleged 
Partnership Agreement With The Owners Of The 
Property Gives Him An Interest In The 
Property As Well As The Profits. His Claim 
Would Be Barred Even In Those States 
Recognizing Oral Real Estate Partnerships. 
The courts of some states have made an 
exception to the Statute of Frauds for partnership or joint 
venture agreements concerning distribution of profits or 
compensation derived from the sale of land. Those same courts 
have held, as the majority rule, that a partnership agreement 
by which one obtains an interest in the real estate itself, as 
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opposed to a mere interest in profits, is not within that 
exception. Johnson v. Gilbert, 621 P.2d 916, 919 (Ariz. App. 
1980); Plummer v. Foqlev, 363 P.2d 238, 241 (Okla. 1961). 
In Johnson the court distinguished Eads v. 
Murphy, 27 Ariz. 267, 232 P.877 (1925), the case relied upon by 
Mackintosh in his opening brief, and held that the reasoning in 
that case did not apply to the situation where one partner or 
joint venturer was attempting to enforce an interest in the 
land as opposed to a share of the profits or compensation 
derived from speculation in land. 621 P.2d .at. 919. 
Similarly, in Plummer, the plaintiff alleged 
that defendant promised him a partnership interest of 25 
percent, plus a salary for operating the business contemplated 
by the parties. The court held that the parties had agreed to 
later enter into a partnership agreement but the agreement was 
unenforceable because it contemplated that plaintiff would have 
an interest in real property and no signed memorandum supported 
plaintiff's version of the facts. The court held 
the statute of frauds applies to an agreement 
claimed to constitute a partnership or profit 
sharing agreement where, under it, one party is 
to have an interest in the lands of the other, or 
lands standing in the name of the other. 363 
P.2d at 241. 
This is exactly what Mackintosh claimed in the court 
below. Mackintosh claimed he had a partnership agreement 
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by which he was to have an interest in property which 
stood in the name of another. In his response brief to 
Judge Noel, Mackintosh stated: 
the "notice of interest" which [Mackintosh] 
recorded was a factual statement that the entity 
which held legal title, Machan-Hampshire 
Properties, Inc. had agreed with him for an 
interest in the property. (Emphasis added.) 
[R.415]. 
Mackintosh precipitated this lawsuit by 
filing a sworn, notarized statement that he "does hereby 
assert and claim an interest in that parcel of real 
property located at 1245 East Brickyard Road . . . " 
[R.7], Addendum Exhibit "D". 
Even Mackintosh's argument before this 
Court that Brickyard is not a bona fide purchaser and 
therefore received the real property subject to his 
interest presupposes that he is seeking to enforce an 
interest in the real property that was transferred to 
Brickyard and not a mere "share in the profits" agreement 
with the corporation. 
Because Mackintosh claimed an interest 
in the property, the alleged agreement would be barred by 
the Statute of Frauds even if Utah followed the so called 
"majority rule". The court below correctly dismissed 
defendant's claim based upon his alleged interest in the 
real property. 
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3. Mackintosh's Allegations Of Part Performance 
Cannot Avoid The Statute Of Frauds In An Action 
For Damages. 
The doctrine of part performance is an 
equitable doctrine which cannot be invoked in an action for 
money damages. In McKinnon v. Corporation Of The President Of 
The Church Of Jesus Christ Of Latter Day Saints, 529 P.2d 434 
(Utah 1974) the Utah Supreme Court held "the doctrine of part 
performance is not available in an action at law for monetary 
damages for breach of an oral contract to convey land." 529 
P.2d at 436. 
Mackintosh's counterclaim sought only money 
damages from Brickyard. In fact, Brickyard is no longer the 
owner of the property and Mackintosh could not seek nor obtain 
specific performance. The doctrine of part performance is 
totally inapplicable. 
4. There Is No Part Performance Of This 
Alleged Oral Contract Sufficient To Remove 
It From The Statute Of Frauds Even If Part 
Performance Were Applicable. 
In Utah, part performance will remove an 
oral contract from the Statute of Frauds only if the alleged 
part performance is "exclusively referrable" to the alleged 
oral contract. Martin v. Scholl, 678 P.2d 274, 279 (Utah 
1983). In other words, the acts constituting the alleged part 
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performance must admit to no interpretation but that the 
alleged oral contract existed. Id« 
In Martin the plaintiff had labored long, 
hard days for over 30 years for a salary ranging from $75 per 
month to $375 per month. The trial court had found these facts 
constituted part performance, removing from the Statute of 
Frauds an oral agreement by the defendants to convey certain 
real estate to the plaintiff. The Supreme Court reversed 
holding that plaintiffs acts were "not atypical of a ranch 
foreman's life . . ." 678 P.2 at. 279 and thus were not 
exclusively referable to the alleged agreement to convey land. 
Similarly, the acts which Mackintosh alleges 
as part performance of this alleged oral contract, i.e., 
securing construction financing, and guaranteeing the notes are 
not atypical of actions taken by the president and chief 
!/• All of the cases cited by Mackintosh in support of his part 
performance argument were decided before Martin. In Martin the 
Supreme Court distinguished cases such as those cited by Mackintosh 
holding: 
In all of our cases either the requirement of acts of 
exclusive referability was met, or it was relaxed where 
there was no evidentiary concern regarding the existence 
of a contract. 678 P.2d ££ 279. 
In this case the contract claim was hotly disputed and the facts 
preponderate against Mackintosh's claim of a contract. Thus, 
Martin's exclusively referable rule is the standard any alleged part 
performance must meet. 
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financial officer of a corporation engaged in the business of 
developing and marketing commercial real estate. See, Bravlines, 
Inc. v. Utah Carriers, Inc., 739 P.2d 1115 (Utah 
App. 1987). In fact, Mackintosh himself testified he signed the 
guarantee because he was in the posture of becoming president of the 
corporation and such acts were part of his new duties. Mackintosh 
deposition, p. 102 [R.511], Addendum Exhibit "C". 
That five of the potential bonus items on the 
Exhibit E-4 were realized, while three were not, argues against the 
assertion that the exhibit was anything more than a list of 
potential bonuses. The exihibit certainly is not evidence 
exclusively referrable to an alleged oral contract that Mackintosh 
was to receive everything appearing on the Exhibit. These facts are 
indicative that Mr. Hampshire's interpretation of the Exhibit—that 
it was only a suggestion of bonuses that might materialize—is in 
fact the truth. Mackintosh's part performance argument must fail. 
5. Several Writings Referring To Different 
Transactions Cannot Be Construed Together To Meet 
The Statute Of Frauds Memorandum Requirement. 
Just as part performance must serve an 
evidentiary function by being exclusively referable to the 
alleged oral agreement, before several writings some signed and 
some unsigned can be read together to meet the Statute of 
Frauds memorandum requirement all of the documents must 
reference a single transaction and not be explicable except as 
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elements of the alleged oral contract. Greoerson v. Jensen, 
617 P.2d 369, 373 (Utah 1980). 
To the trial court, Mackintosh presented 
only one document which he argued could be construed with other 
documents to constitute a signed memorandum of his alleged oral 
agreement. That document was the April 12, 1983 indemnity 
agreement, a document signed at the time of Mackintosh's 
resignation from Machan Hampshire Properties, Inc. indemnifying 
him from all liabilities incurred incident to his association 
with the corporation. Judge Noel properly concluded "the 
indemnity agreement, a document prepared at the time of 
Mackintosh's resignation from Machan Hampshire Properties, Inc. 
as an accommodation to the retiring employee, cannot be said to 
have reference to an alleged oral contract made more than one 
year earlier." [R.456], Addendum Exhibit "A". 
B. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT MACKINTOSH 
CANNOT STATE A CLAIM AGAINST BRICKYARD OFFICE 
ASSOCIATES OR ITS PROPERTY ARISING FROM AN 
ALLEGED PRE-PARTNERSHIP OBLIGATION OF THE 
CORPORATION. 
As a separate and independent ground for 
decision, Judge Noel ruled that the partnership could not be 
liable for contractual obligations of Mackintosh's former 
employer. [R.5], Addendum Exhibit "A". This ruling was correct. 
1. Mackintosh Is Not A Partner In Brickyard 
Office Associates. Ltd. 
A partnership is a consensual relationship 
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and no partnership is created without the voluntary consent of 
all the partners, Utah Code Annotated, § 48-1-15(7). Ferguson 
v. Jeanes, 619 P.2d 369, 373 (Wash. App. 1980). Moreover, when 
the agreement is that a partnership will come into existence at 
some future time or upon the happening of an event, no 
partnership exists until the agreed time arrives or the event 
occurs. Car Doctor, Inc. v. Belmont, 635 P.2d 82 (Utah 1981); 
Bencoe v. Bencoe, 305 P.2d 370, 373 (N.M. 1956). 
Mackintosh testified that he was told he 
would not be a partner in Brickyard. Mackintosh deposition, 
pp. 89 and 140. [R.511], Addendum Exhibit "C". Mackintosh 
further testified that no partnership was ever formed which 
included him. Mackintosh deposition, p. 116. [R.511], 
Addendum Exhibit "C". Brickyard's partners have never 
consented to having Mackintosh as a partner in Brickyard Office 
Associates, Ltd. Affidavit of Gary L. Machan dated November 
28, 1984, mr 4, 5, and 6 [R.77], Addendum Exhibit "F-. 
Even if Mackintosh's version of the 
conversations concerning a purported interest were true, they 
do not, under the law, entitle him to an interest in Brickyard 
or its property. 
2. Defendant-Appellant Has No Claim Against 
Plaintiff Arising From Prior Acts Of Its 
Partners Functioning In A Corporate Entity. 
A partnership is a distinct entity from its 
-17-
partners. Southard v. Oil Equipment Corp., 296 P.2d 780, 784 
(Okla. 1956). A partnership is not liable for the 
pre-partnership obligation of its partners that have not been 
assumed. N.L.R.B. v. International Hod Carriers Building & 
Common Laborer's Union of America, 287 F.2d 605, 610 (9th Cir. 
1961); Gold Fork Lumber Co. v. Sweanv & Smith Co., 205 P. 554 
(Idaho 1922); even if the pre-partnership obligation was 
incurred for partnership purposes. 60 AmJur 2d § 161 .a£ 82. 
In N.L.R.B. plaintiffs were trying to 
enforce against the partnership a collective bargaining 
agreement entered into at a time when the business was being 
operated as a sole proprietorship by one of the partners. The 
court held the agreement was not enforceable against the 
partnership absent a showing the obligation was assumed by the 
partnership. 
At most, Mackintosh alleged an oral 
agreement between himself and entities that have but a 
tangential connection to the plaintiff. That agreement is 
clearly not enforceable against plaintiff. There is no 
evidence of any assumption by plaintiff of the alleged 
agreement. On the contrary, the undisputed evidence shows that 
Brickyard Office Associates refused to recognize the alleged 
agreement and Mackintosh was clearly told he would have no 
interest in the plaintiff. Judge Noel correctly ruled 
"whatever agreement defendant may have had with someone, it is 
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undisputed that he had no agreement with the plaintiff. The 
plaintiff did not exist until September 20, 1983, long after 
the conversations on which defendant's contract claim is 
based. A partnership, such as plaintiff, is not bound by the 
pre-partnership obligations of its partners or others having 
some relationship to the partnership." [R.5], Addendum Exhibit 
"A" . 
C. THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION NOT TO ADD MACHAN & 
HAMPSHIRE AS PARTIES IS NOT BEFORE THIS COURT. 
Judge Dee denied Mackintosh's motion to bring in 
Gary L. Machan and John R. Hampshire as third-party defendants 
on September 29, 1986, more than one year ago [R.223, 224], 
Addendum Exhibit "G". The time to appeal has long since past. 
Moreover, in response to that decision, 
Mackintosh filed an action against Mr. Machan and Mr. Hampshire 
and that action is now pending in the Third Judicial District 
Court before Judge Rigtrup, Case No. C86-6390. Any claims 
Mackintosh asserts against Messrs Machan and Hampshire are not 
properly before this Court. 
Judge Noel ruled in the Order and Judgment, 
approved as to form by Mr. Fadel, that if Mackintosh had an 
oral agreement with anyone, "it is undisputed that he had no 
agreement with the plaintiff." [R.458], Addendum Exhibit "A". 
(A partnership with partners other than Machan & Hampshire). 
That was the only issue before Judge Noel and, since Mackintosh 
-19-
chose not to appeal Judge Dee's earlier ruling, that is the 
only issue before this Court. 
D. DENIAL BY A PREVIOUS JUDGE OF A MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS NOT A FINAL JUDGMENT BINDING 
ON A SECOND JUDGE. 
Defendant cites Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-19 for the 
proposition that a summary judgment motion, once denied, cannot 
later be renewed. This precise argument was rejected by the 
Utah Supreme Court in Hammer v. Gibbons & Reed Co., 510 P.2d 
1104, 1105 (Utah 1973). In Hammer, the judge who denied the 
first summary judgment motion was deceased. Some additional 
discovery had occurred and a pretrial conference before the new 
judge had been held. The Supreme Court held that in these 
circumstances, § 78-7-19 had no application and the court 
properly entertained the new motion. Hammer is 
indistinguishable from the posture of this case before Judge 
Noel. 
E. PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT IS NOT ESTOPPED 
Mackintosh's estoppel argument was not made to 
the trial court and therefore should not be considered on 
appeal. Banqerter v. Poulton, 663 P.2d 100 (Utah 1983). In 
any event/ estoppel is inapplicable in this case. 
The Utah Supreme Court in McKinnon v. Corporation 
of The President of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day 
Saints, 529 P.2d 434 (Utah 1974) held that estoppel will not 
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provide relief unless the conduct of the promissor is such that 
he clearly manifests an intention that he will not assert the 
Statute of Frauds. Mackintosh can point to no action by 
Brickyard in which Brickyard represented that it would not 
assert the Statute of Frauds. To the contrary, all of the 
evidence shows that Mackintosh was clearly told at every turn 
that he would not become a partner in Brickyard Office 
Associates, Ltd., and that he would not have any interest in 
that partnership. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
For the above stated reasons, plaintiff-respondent 
Brickyard Office Associates, Inc. respectfully requests that 
this Court affirm the trial court's decision. 
DATED: October , 1987. 
BERMAN & O'RORKE 
Blake S. Atkin 
50 South Main Street, #1250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent 
2019b 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On this ^ i£_day of October, 1987, I hereby certify 
that I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to the following: 
George K. Fadel 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
170 West 400 South 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
2109b 
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FiL tD i,NJ CLERKS OFFiCS 
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J UN 3 0 1987 
By TSTffl -jurt 
Deputy Cierk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
'&K £1/3 Aid- £3Vg 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
BRICKYARD OFFICE ASSOCIATES, 
a Utah Limited Partnership, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DEAN A. MACKINTOSH, 
Defendant* 
Civil No. 84C-04060 
Judge Frank G. Noel 
1. On June 22, 1987, at 9:00 a.m., hearing was held 
on plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment. Plaintiff 
was represented by Blake S. Atkin and defendant was represented 
by George K. Fadel. 
2. Having considered the written materials on file 
relating to this motion and having heard the arguments of 
counsel and being fully apprised in the premises, the Court 
finds as follows: 
3. On January 4, 1984, at a time when plaintiff 
alleges that it was the owner of a parcel of real property 
known as the Brickyard Office Tower located at 1245 East 
Brickyard Road in Salt Lake County, Utah, (which allegation is 
disputed by defendant) defendant Dean A. Mackintosh signed, 
swore to and caused to be filed a "Notice of Interest" stating 
"the undersigned does hereby assert and claim an interest in 
EXHIBIT A 
ST. 
that parcel of real property located at 1245 East Brickyard 
Road, Salt Lake County, Utah, . . . said interest arises by and 
through an agreement entered into by and between the 
undersigned and the owners of said parcel," 
4. Plaintiff filed this action seeking a declaratory 
judgment that the notice of interest filed by the defendant was 
null and void and also seeking damages for slander of title. 
5. Defendant answered alleging an oral agreement 
between himself and Gary L. Machan, John R. Hampshire, and/or 
Machan-Hampshire Properties, Inc. by which defendant was 
allegedly promised a ten percent interest in the development 
known as the Brickyard Office Tower as a defense to plaintiff's 
complaint. In addition, defendant filed a counterclaim against 
the plaintiff based on this alleged oral agreement between 
himself and Gary L. Machan, John R. Hampshire and/or 
Machan-Hampshire Properties, Inc. 
6. Neither John R. Hampshire, Gary L. Machan or 
Machan-Hampshire Properties, Inc. is a party to this lawsuit or 
a partner in the plaintiff limited partnership. 
7. Defendant Dean A. Mackintosh testified in his 
deposition that there was no signed memorandum of this alleged 
oral agreement and the Court has been directed to no memorandum 
signed by the plaintiff or any person affiliated with the 
plaintiff or this property which in any way relates to the 
alleged oral agreement. The Court was directed by defendant to 
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an "indemnity agreement" which he alleged could be read with 
other documents in the case to constitute a sufficient 
memorandum of the alleged oral agreement to comply with the 
statute of frauds. The indemnity agreement makes no mention of 
the alleged oral agreement, however. Instead, the indemnity 
agreement was executed at the time of defendant's resignation 
more than a year after the conversations on which the alleged 
oral agreement is based. In order for several documents, some 
signed and some unsigned to be read together to meet the 
memorandum requirement of the Statute of Frauds, they must all 
reference a single transaction. Gregerson v. Jensen, 617 P.2d 
369, 373 (Utah 1980). The "indemnity agreement", a document 
prepared at the time of the defendant's resignation from Machan 
Hampshire Properties, Inc., as an accommodation to the retiring 
employee, cannot be said to have reference to an alleged oral 
contract made more than one year earlier. Therefore, the Court 
finds that it is undisputed that there is no signed memorandum 
of this alleged oral agreement. 
8. Plaintiff filed this motion for summary judgment 
seeking a ruling that the notice of interest is null and void 
and of no legal force or effect; that the alleged oral 
agreement between Dean Mackintosh and Gary Machan, John 
Hampshire or Machan-Hampshire Properties, Inc. is not a defense 
to plaintiff's claims for slander of title and for judgment 
that defendant's counterclaims, based on an alleged oral 
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agreement between the defendant and Gary Machan, John Hampshire 
or Machan-Hampshire Properties, Inc. is barred by the statute 
of frauds and is unenforceable against the plaintiff because 
the plaintiff was not a party to that agreement and that the 
plaintiff cannot be bound by the prepartnership obligations of 
those having a tangential relationship to the plaintiff. 
9. Defendant argued in response to plaintiff's 
motion for summary judgment that the alleged oral agreement was 
not barred by the Statute of Frauds because the agreement was 
that he would receive an interest in a partnership that would 
own the real property, rather than an interest in the real 
property itself. 
10. The Court concludes that defendant's alleged oral 
agreement between himself and Gary L. Machan, John R. Hampshire 
or Machan-Hampshire Properties, Inc., by which defendant is 
alleged to have been promised a ten percent interest in the 
Brickyard Office Tower project, is barred by the Statute of 
Frauds. 
11. Under Utah law, an oral agreement for an interest 
in a partnership to deal in real property is barred by the 
Statute of Frauds whether or not an interest in the real 
property itself is involved. Peterson v. Hendricks, 524 P.2d 
321 (Utah 1974); Guinand v. Walton, 450 P.2d 467 (Utah 1969); 
later appeal 480 P.2d 137 (Utah 1971). 
12. Moreover, even in those states that recognize 
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oral partnerships to deal in profits from real property, the 
Statute of Frauds bars an oral partnership by which one is to 
obtain an interest in real property standing in the name of the 
other. Johnson v. Gilbert, 621 P.2d 916, 919, Ariz. App. 1980; 
Plumber v. Fogley, 363 P.2d 238, 241 (Okla. 1961). 
13. The notice of interest filed by the defendant 
clearly states that he is claiming an interest in that parcel 
of real property located at 1245 East Brickyard Road. Thus, 
defendant's alleged oral agreement by which he alleges that he 
was to have a partnership interest is barred by the Statute of 
Frauds. 
14. The Court concludes as a separate and independent 
ground for decision that the alleged oral agreement cannot be 
enforced against the plaintiff Brickyard Office Associates. 
Whatever agreement defendant may have had with someone, it is 
undisputed that he had no agreement with the plaintiff. The 
plaintiff did not exist until September 20, 1983, long after 
the conversations on which defendant's contract claim is 
based. A partnership, such as plaintiff, is not bound by the 
prepartnership obligations of its partners or others having 
some relationship to the partnership. N.L.R.B. v. 
International Hodd Carriers Building and Common Laborer's Union 
Of America, 287 F.2d 605, 610 (9th Cir. 1961); Gold Fork Lumber 
Co. v. Sweary & Smith Co., 205 P. 554 (Idaho 1922). 
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It is therefore 
ORDERED: 
1. That defendant has no cause of action against the 
plaintiff and therefore, his counterclaims are dismissed; 
2. That defendant has no right, title or interest to 
or in the subject real property and the "Notice of Interest" is 
null and void and without legal effect; 
3. That the alleged oral agreement between defendant 
and John R. Hampshire, Gary L. Machan or Machan-Hampshire 
Properties, Inc. is not a defense to plaintiff's slander of 
title claims. However, defendant is not barred from raising 
other defenses to plaintiff's slander of title claims. 
4. That there is no just reason for delay and final 
judgment on defendant's counterclaims against the plaintiff is 
hereby entered as a final and appealable order. 
DATED this 3D 
day of Ouv,!^!-^ ___ , 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
Hon. Frank &. Noel 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to Form Only: * ^ —.g-^^-
Ji/,f / A i T t * t 
. ^ jAf^r/. J w- CiXON HINDI LV 
By Pfl-t- =|ffnm— _ 
uv'r'V.: 
oo° 
'FiuBiHciimamet 
5At.nAf.Ie9UNt?,UTAH 
Nov 4 II dz AM'88 
Daniel L. Berman A0304 
Dale F. Gardiner, 114-7 
Blake S. Atkin 4466 
BERMAN & O'RORKE 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
(801) 328-2200 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BRICKYARD OFFICE ASSOCIATES, j 
a Utah limited partnership, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
«• ! 
DEAN A. MACKINTOSH, ] 
Defendant. ) 
> AFFIDAVIT OF 
> JOHN N. OWENS 
i Civil No. C84-4060 
> Judge David 8. Dee 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss . 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
John N. O m e n s , having been first duly suiorn deposes and 
says: 
1. I am general counsel for Brickyard Office 
Associates, Ltd., the plaintiff in this action. I haue personal 
knowledge of the matters set forth herein. 
2. Brickyard Office Associates, Ltd. is a Utah 
limited partnership. The partnership was formed on September 20, 
1983 with the Machan family limited partnership and the Hampshire 
family limited partnership as general partners, and Bud Leach as 
EXHIBIT B 
H* DIXON rUMOLEYQlIRK 
3«o DISf;CjjilflT 
the sole limited partner. No other partners have been admitted 
to the partnership. A copy of the limited partnership 
certificate and agreement is attached as Exhibit A. 
3. Brickyard Office Associates is presently the owner 
of the Brickyard Tower office building located at 124-5 East 
Brickyard Road, which is the subject of this lawsuit. (the 
Property). 
4. From August 10, 1981 through December 30, 1983, 
the property has been owned as follows: 
Date Grantor Grantee Exhibit 
August 10, 1981 Brickyard Assoc. Machan-Hampshire B 
Properties, Inc. 
Sept. 22, 1982 Machan-Hampshire M.H. Properties, a C 
Properties, Inc. Utah general partnership 
April 6, 1982 M.H. Properties Machan family limited D 
partnership (50%) 
April 6, 1982 M.H. Properties Hampshire family limited E 
partnership (50%) 
Dec. 29, 1982 M.H. Properties Bud Leach (7%) F 
Sept. 23, 1983 Bud Leach Brickyard Office G 
Associates, Ltd. (7%) 
Sept. 23, 1983 Machan family Brickyard Office Assoc. (42.5%) H 
limited 
partnership 
Sept. 23, 1983 Hampshire family Brickyard Office Assoc. (42.5%) I 
limited 
partnership 
Oct. 3, 1983 Brickyard Office Utah Title Company J 
Assoc. Ltd. 
Dec. 30, 1983 Utah Title Co. Brickyard Office Assoc. K 
Ltd. 
-2- ooorA 
Certified copies of the deeds evidencing these 
transactions are attached as Exhibits "B" through "K". 
DATED: October *5( 1986. 
wens 
On this ^  day of November, 1986, personally appeared 
before me John N. Owens, the signer of the foregoing instrument, 
who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the_ same 
My Commission Expires: 
IX 90b 
NOTARY P-
Residing 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On this day of November, 1986, I hereby certify 
that I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN N. OWENS to the 
following: 
1190b 
George K. Fadel, Esq. 
170 West 400 South 
Bountiful, Utah 84-010 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALE LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * 
BRICKYARD OFFICE ASSOCIATES, 
a Utah limited partnership, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DEAN A. MACKINTOSH, 
Defendant. 
Civil No. C-84-4060 
Deposition of: 
DEAN A. MACKINTOSH 
* * * 
Deposition of DEAN A. MACKINTOSH, taken at the 
instance and request of the Plaintiffs, at the law offices of 
Berraan § Anderson, 1250 Crossroads Plaza, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, on the 25th day of September, 1984, at the hour of 9:30 
a.m., before LANETTE SHINDURLING, a Certified Shorthand 
Reporter, Utah License No. 122, and Notary Public in and for 
the State of Utah. 
IB 
* * * 
FOR RUNG RETURN TO 
NOV 231984 '" 
Associated Professional Reporters 
420KearnsBldg /Salt LakeCity.UT 84101/(800322-3441 fILMED 
_^ EXHIBIT C * \ 000511 
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1 Q And then was there any discussion at that time as to 
2 what your compensation would be after that? 
3 A No* At that point in July? 
4 Q Yes. 
5 A No. At that point we would see how things worked, 
6 how I worked, what the comfort was and regroup and reestablish 
7 from there. 
8 Q Did Mr. Machan discuss with you the policy or 
9 procedures of Machan Hampshire Properties with respect to 
10 year-end bonuses? 
11 A Yes, he did. Again, this was during the preparatory 
12 meetings, the initial meetings. He indicated that based upon 
13 production and what was accomplished and so forth that my 
14 bonuses would be based and indicated even though I didn't 
15 probably anticipate it would be that grand, he indicated that 
16 possibly as much as a hundred thousand could be earned by an 
17 individual, salary and bonus, based upon how well the company 
18 did and what was accomplished. 
19 Q And he told you--
20 A And that was the reason for my starting work at 
21 $20,000. One, to see if there was a fit, if I could produce 
22 and if there was a comfort with them, and from that point on 
23 we would have salary changes and bonuses thereafter. 
24 Q And Mr. Machan told you, then, in July that bonuses 
25 and salary changes would be determined at year-end? 
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A That's right, 
Q In December? 
A Yes. 
Q And you understood during your employment thatfs 
generally how it was done at Machan Hampshire? 
A That's exactly right* 
Q And those year-end determinations regarding bonuses 
would be for the year prior, is that right? That is, for 
December, 1980 they would look back to the prior year to 
determine what the bonuses would be for production during 1980? 
A Well, that was the case in 1980, that was the case 
in 1981. Also at the end of 1931, because of the comfort level 
we had established at that time, they also indicated what my 
up-coming bonuses and participation would be. 
Q Ahead of time? 
A Yes. 
Q Before the production and before knowing how you 
performed? 
A Well, they knew what projects we had already been 
working on and based upon those things coming about and 
continuing, those bonuses and partnership participations were 
anticipated what they would be, yes. 
Q Do you know of any other instance at Machan 
Hampshire Properties where an employee was told what his bonus 
would be for the forthcoming year? 
30 
Q You had only one meeting in December, 1981 relating 
to the specifics of your bonus for 1981 and that meeting was 
with Mr. Hampshire? 
A That is true. 
Q Do you recall when in December that meeting occurred? 
A I don't recall. 
Q Early or late? 
A It would have been •• as I recall, it was an evening 
meeting. As I recall, it was a Sunday evening meeting, but my 
recollection could be invalid. But as I recall, it was where 
we wouldn't have the time pressures of phones ringing and so 
forth and that because of the nature of the topic it was done 
in a leisurely manner. 
Q And that was in Mr. Hampshire's office? 
A Thatfs correct. 
Q What was said and by whom, to the best of your 
recollection, during that meeting? 
A John just indicated to me what my 1981 salary and 
bonus would be. 
Q Let me stop you right there. Instead of saying that 
he indicated something, tell me what he said and what you said 
without giving me your conclusions. 
A I am not giving you conclusions. I'm telling you 
what he said. 
Q No. You said he indicated what your bonus would be. 
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I'm asking you instead of your concluding what the substance 
was, tell me what it is he said. 
A Okay. He said, "Your 1981 salary and bonus, your 
salary was $30,000, your bonus will be one percent of the 
Oakwood Storage and a thousand dollar cash bonus.ff 
Q Anything else said at that meeting? 
A Yes. He then indicated to me what my 1982 salary 
structure and bonus would be. One, that I would have -- if I 
recall, he indicated that I would have a one percent ownership 
in Silver Cliff, he indicated that I would have a one percent 
ownership in Cottonwood Towers, but that would not happen if we 
did not produce the property or develop the property, if we 
resold the land I would not have a participation in that. He 
indicated that I would have a two percent interest in Vantage 
Point. He indicated that I would have a 10 percent interest in 
the Brickyard, and he indicated that I would have a 10 percent 
interest in all future MH Properties developments, and he 
indicated that my salary structure would go to $35,000 in June, 
1982. 
Q Your testimony concerning what Mr. Hampshire said 
during that meeting has been refreshed by a document, is that 
right? 
A That is correct. 
(Whereupon, Exhibit No. 4 
was marked 
for identification.) 
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A I certainly made that assumption. 
Q Regardless of what happened during 1982? 
A I don't know if I would say regardless of what 
happened. If we had to sell Silver Cliff or Diagonal or 
something, if we had things beyond our control, if certain 
things evolved, then we would restructure at that point. But 
certainly my participation would happen the same as what theirs 
would happen. I also forgot to mention I would have 10 percent 
of the corporation which I did receive. I received that before 
1982 had terminated so I think the nature, the intent of the 
conversation was is that was going to be mine because the 
ownership of the corporation happened before 1982 had passed. 
Q You received 10 percent of Machan Hampshire 
Properties, Inc.? 
A That's correct. 
Q By way of stock certificates? 
A That's correct. 
Q Did you bring copies of those stock certificates 
today? 
A No, I didn't. 
Q Do you have those? 
A I do have them secured. 
Q Where are they located? 
A In a lock box. 
Q Your box? 
41 
cash bonus of a thousand dollars and another one percent 
ownership in Oakwood Storage which he later changed to Oakwood 
Office Associates. 
Q Tell me everything that you recall that was said 
during that December, 1982 meeting with Mr. Machan. 
A Again, we reviewed--
Q You tell me reviewed, but tell me what was said. 
A That I would receive the items enumerated by John 
Hampshire in December of 1981. 
Q Mr. Machan said that? 
A Yes, that's right. 
Q Did he say, "You'll receive the items designated by 
Mr. Hampshire last year", or did he have a list or did you go 
over them and itemize them? 
A He had the same list and went over them and 
enumerated them. 
Q He had a copy of Exhibit 4? 
A That's exactly right. 
Q So December, 1982, you met with Mr. Machan in his 
office? 
A That's correct. 
Q And that was the only meeting in December, 1982 
during which a bonus was discussed? 
A To my recollection, yes. 
Q And Mr. Hampshire wasn't present during that meeting? 
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A 
Q 
A 
Q 
things? 
A 
indicated 
and a one 
Q 
A 
Office. 
That is correct. 
And Mr. Machan reviewed Exhibit 4? 
That is correct. 
Were you told that you would receive all of those 
That is correct. In addition to that he also 
that I would receive a thousand dollar cash bonus 
percent interest in Oakwood Storage. 
And did you receive any of those items? 
I received the one percent ownership in Oakwood 
I received the $1,000 cash bonus. I received the two 
percent Vantage Point ownership. I received the 10 percent 
ownership 
been real 
in the corporation. My June salary increase had 
ized and they were in the process of effecting the 10 
percent ownership in Brickyard. 
Q 
A 
Petersen 
Q 
beginning 
A 
When was your June salary realized, the increase? 
I believe it was the beginning of June. Both Milt 
and myself received that at the same time. 
Your salary was increased to $35,000 a year 
June 1, 1982? 
That's correct. I was paid out of Machan Hampshire 
Properties, Inc. and Mr. Petersen was paid out of MH Property 
Management, I believe. 
Q You referred to receiving two percent of Vantage 
Point. That's the same thing as Diagonal, is that correct? 
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Q Yes. 
A I don't believe we discussed much about how he felt 
about me personally because there had been certain 
altercations or whatever between Mr. Machan and myself 
subsequent to -- well, just before June of 1982, the period of 
time when I was to have been made president of Machan 
Hampshire Properties, Inc. So I don't believe that we 
discussed whether he was pleased or displeased with my 
performance at that point. We discussed what my bonus, 
additional bonus would be and also the things that they had 
discussed with me the previous year for 1982. He had 
indicated that those things were still in place. In fact, as 
I was — well, in that meeting he just indicated that's what 
my salary would be. I don't recall whether he said he was 
pleased or displeased. It was assumed he was still pleased 
with my performance though we had still had a few personality 
conflicts or he would not have, I presume, given me the 
thousand dollars cash bonus and the one percent ownership in 
Oakwood Storage. 
Q You said something about in June, '82 you were to 
become president of Machan Hampshire Properties? 
A That's right. 
Q And what was that expectation based upon? 
A Mr. Machan's offering the position to me based upon 
performance by myself. 
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Q What was the nature of that interest? 
A For work performed, guarantees made and 
representations made by the people I was working with. 
Q Exhibit No. 6 refers to an agreement entered into by 
and between the undersigned, that is, you, and the owners of 
the parcel of real property? 
A Yes. 
Q What was that agreement? 
A The agreement was an oral agreement described --
that we have been describing and discussing this morning as 
well as a writing instrument which I have given you as Exhibit 
4 including an unconditional guaranty made on my behalf to MH 
Properties given and signed for Rainier Bank. 
Q Is there any other thing in writing reflecting the 
agreement to which reference is made in Exhibit 6? 
A That's this? Is there anything else -- I'm sorry. 
Q Is there anything else in writing reflecting the 
agreement to which reference is made in Exhibit 6? 
A Other than what I have indicated? 
Q You've indicated Exhibit 4 and your unconditional 
guaranty. 
A I don't know if I can discover anything further at 
this point. 
Q You know of nothing else in writing? 
A I haven't discovered. There may be other things 
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which I'm not aware of at this time, 
Q You know of nothing as you sit here now in writing 
reflecting that agreement? 
A Just this Exhibit 4 and a duplication of that which 
Gary Machan used. 
Q That's it? 
A That's it-
Q Exhibit 4 was never signed by you or by Mr. 
Hampshire or by Mr. Machan, is that right? 
A That is true. Exhibit 4 is in John Hampshire's 
handwriting and Gary Machan had utilized that same document to 
make his notes. 
Q You say--
A So the only writing was by them. I did not write on 
them at all. 
Q You stated earlier that in December, 1981 when you 
had this oral agreement. I take it, that's the oral agreement 
you referred to? 
A (Indicating affirmatively.) 
Q Yes? 
A Yes. 
Q That was during your discussion with Mr. Hampshire? 
A And later with Mr. Machan when he asked me if 
everything was in place and I said yes. Again, in 1982 when I 
discussed it with Mr. Machan again and said that everything 
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was in place. So yes, three different occasions , once with 
Mr. Hampshire and once with Mr. Machan in '81 and once with 
Mr. Machan in f82. 
Q 
during 
A 
Q 
Well, did you feel that you reached an 
the first meeting in December, 1981 with 
Yes. 
Was that agreement altered in any way 
conversations or discussions? 
A 
agreement 
Mr. Hampshire? 
during later 
Not from my side, no, and not to my knowledge did 
they change it. 
Q And as of December, 1981, you were receiving a bonus 
of $1,000 cash plus one percent interest in the 
for services performed in 1981? 
A 
Q 
Thatfs correct. 
And you were also as a bonus for 1982 
those things listed on Exhibit 4 under 1982? 
A 
Q 
Thatfs true. 
Were you to do anything? Was there to 
mini-storage 
to receive 
be anything 
done by you whatsoever to receive any of those interests under 
1982? 
hasnft 
MR. FADEL: I think he's answered that 
he? 
THE WITNESS: I really believe I have. 
keep hitting the question over and over. I don1 
else ta > answer it other than as I've answered it 
a few times, 
I think you 
t know how 
. 
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Q Yes, it is. 
MR. FADEL: Yes, thatfs all right, if you know. 
THE WITNESS: Safford, Bryant Safford. 
Q (BY MR. ANDERSON) At what company? 
A Associated Title. 
Q What was your purpose for filing the notice of 
interest? 
A When I had approached Mr. Machan in the fall of 
1983, I had asked him when we were going to put the 
partnership together and he was on his way out from his office. 
"Oh", he says "we1re not going to give you any of it." I said, 
"What do you mean?" He said, "We've decided you didn't earn 
it, you're not going to get it." I said, "You understand what 
the agreement was when I left?" He says, "Fine, sue me." I 
says, "What, and be like every other employee that's worked 
for you, have to sue you for it?" At that point I didn't have 
the cash resources, I didn't have the time to pursue what 
everybody else had gone through with him, so I felt the most 
expedient way to preserve my interest in the property was to 
file a notice of interest and in so doing we could bring it to 
a point and we could formulate what they had presented to me 
that they would give to me. 
Q But they never represented to you that you would be 
given an interest in the real property, isn't that correct? 
A They represented to me that they would --
102 
Q Was it a face-to-face meeting? 
A Yes. 
Q In Mr. Machan's office? 
A I have no recollection of which office it was in. It 
was a face-to-face discussion. 
Q But only the two of you were present? 
A I donft even recall that only the two of us were 
present. It could have been discussed in a staff meeting, it 
could have been discussed with John and Gary and I together. 
Q What was said and by whom during that meeting? 
A Gary said that I would be required to sign on the 
note on the loan with he and John because now I was in the 
posture of possibly becoming president of the company and if I 
was going to have rewards of participation I would also have 
to have the obligation of the liability. 
Q And Mr. Machan told you that was his desire? 
A Yes. 
Q He didn't put it in terms of a requirement by 
Rainier? 
A No. 
Q And did you say you did receive a communication from 
somebody at Rainier with respect to a requirement that you 
execute an unconditional guaranty? 
A Ken Starr -- from the outset it was determined that 
I was going to sign with them. Ken Starr knew that I was 
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get -- that my intention was to get their attention so we 
could resolve the dispute. 
Q Did you acknowledge to Mr. Gee that you had no 
executed agreement with respect to an interest in a 
partnership that owned the property? 
A I did acknowledge that. Nothing had been formed in 
the way of a partnership, but I did also discuss with him that 
I had written schedules from John and Gary regarding what my 
participation was to be. 
Q What in addition to Exhibit 4? 
A I believe you have another exhibit that's been given 
by Mr. Fadel to you right there. 
(Whereupon, Exhibit No. 11 
was marked 
for identification.) 
Q (BY MR. ANDERSON) Okay. You're referring to 
Exhibit 11? 
A Yes. 
Q That's a document you produced to us today? 
A That is correct. 
Q Is that document a copy of a document received by 
you from Mr. Machan? 
A That is true. 
Q And what did you understand the notations on that 
document to mean? 
A Well, at the top he has written "John, Gary and 
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told me the partnership would be formulated with my interest 
included. 
(Whereupon, Exhibit No. 12 
was marked 
for identification.) 
Q (BY MR. ANDERSON) I show you what has been marked 
as Exhibit 12 for identification. That's a document that your 
counsel has produced to us today, is that correct? 
A That is correct. 
Q Can you identify that document? 
A Yes. This is an assignment of my partnership 
interest in the Vantage Point, in which I agreed to sell my 
two percent interest in Vantage Point to MH Properties, and at 
this time, this was in May -- well, first of all, do you want 
me to elaborate? 
Q No. I don't want you to read the document. I just 
want you to tell me, that was signed by you, is that right? 
A That's right. 
Q Other than the limited partnership agreement of 
Vantage Point, Ltd., we have marked all of the documents 
produced by you and your counsel here today? 
A Yes. 
Q And there are no other documents reflecting or 
referring to any agreement between you and Mr. Machan or Mr. 
Hampshire or Machan Hampshire Properties or any affiliated 
companies with regard to an interest that you would have in 
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Brickya 
A 
Q 
in your 
A 
rd? 
Not to my knowledge, no. 
And you know of no other documents anywhere, whether 
possession or otherwise? 
No. 
MR. ANDERSON: Give us a second. I think we1re 
about done. 
Q 
(Short recess.) 
(BY MR. ANDERSON) Ifve just got a few more things. 
Mr. Mackintosh, do you now claim that you have 10 percent 
ownership in Machan Hampshire Properties, Inc.? 
A 
Q 
A 
it lega 
Do I now claim? 
Yes. 
I don't request any interest in that, no. If I have 
lly, yes. I have 10 percent in it, yes. Do I 
anticipate doing anything with it, no. Have I turned it back, 
conveye 
Q 
A 
the cor 
Q 
A 
Q 
Benson 
A 
d it to anybody else, no. 
Do you anticipate doing that? 
Legally at this time I have 10 percent interest in 
poration. 
Do you disclaim 10 percent ownership? 
No, I do not. 
Do you know who signed the stock certificates Mr. 
gave you? 
Reed was -- I don't recall. I really cannot state. 
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that they were putting -- attempting to put a permanent 
financing on. 
Q You stopped in Mr, Machan's office? 
A Yes. 
Q For what reason? 
A To -- well, I went to the office to see Mr. Benson 
and I went into Mr. Machan's office to again ask him the same 
question I had been asking them from the time I left until now, 
MHow was the partnership coming along, what are we going to do 
on it, whatfs the timing?11 
Q Referring to Brickyard? 
A That's right. 
Q And what was said and by whom at that time? 
A He says, !,Youfre not getting a f'g thing.,f I'll be 
happy to be more graphic if you would like. His comment was, 
"You're not getting a thing." I was shocked that he would say 
that. I said, "Why?" His comment was, "You don't deserve it. 
You didn't earn it so we're not going to give it to you." I 
recited for him what our agreement had been, what my guaranty 
had been, et cetera, et cetera. In fact, he did not even 
recite that there had been an indemnification offer given at 
that time. He just said -- the last word he says going out to 
the parking lot was, "Sue me", and my response was, "And be 
like every other employee has had to sue you to get what you 
have offered them?" We laughed and I said, "I'll go ahead and 
Ow«C}03S NOTICE OF !HTr»EST 
The undersigned does hereby assert and claim «n interest in that 
parcel of real property located at 1245 East Brickyard Road, Salt Lake 
County, Utah, and wore particularly described as follows: 
BEGINNING at a point on the northerly line of Brickyard 
Road, said point being South 537.88 feet and West BS0.21 
feet fro* the East qutritr corner of Section 29, Township 
1 South, Range 1 Last, Salt Lake Base and herldian, and 
running thence North 88 degrees West i long said northerly 
l ine of Brickyard Road 30.SO feet to a point of a 616.80 
foot radius curve to the right; thence north-esterly along 
the arc of said curve and '*1d northerly l ine 2*2.22 feet 
through a central angle of .6 degrees 13 minutes 27 seconds 
to a point of compound curve with a 720.00 foot radius curve 
to the right; thence northwesterly along the arc of said 
Curve and said norther'/ l ine 201.88 feet through a central 
angle of 16 degrees 13 minutes 27 seconds to the easterly 
l ine of Brickyard Condominium; thence along said condo-
minium boundary line North 45 degrees *6 minutes East 
463.S2 feet ; thence South 41 degrees 32 minutes OS seconds 
1 -o s c Xt t m 237.S6 f ee t ; thence South 1* degrees 20 minutes West 
. " * 176.37 feet; thence South 75 deurees *0 minutes East 25.00 
-7* 5 I f ee t ; thence South 14 degrees 20 r o u t e s West 138.SO feet 
c TS •: t-o the point of beginning, 
Z P £ Said interest arises by ano through an agreement entered into by 
. . ft sj 
» 1 £ W 
'? £ J^~ •"* between the undersigned and the owners of said parcel. 
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EXHIBIT D 
EXHIBIT E 
STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
25-5-1 Estate or interest in real property. No 
estate or interest in real property, other than leases for a 
term not exceeding one year, nor any trust or power over or 
concerning real property or in any manner relating thereto, 
shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or declared 
otherwise than by act or operation of law, or by deed or 
conveyance in writing subscribed by the party creating, 
granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or by 
his lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing. 
2157b 
Ross C. Anderson, 0190 
William P. Schwartz, 4404 
BERMAN & ANDERSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Telephone (801) 328-2200 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRICKYARD OFFICE ASSOCIATES, ) 
a Utah limited partnership. ) 
Plaintiff, ) AFFIDAVIT OF 
) GARY L. MACHAN 
) C I V I L NO- C 8 4 - 4 0 6 0 
) J u d g e D a v i d B. Dee 
v s . ) 
DEAN A. MACKINTOSH, ) 
Defendant. ) 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Gary L. Machan being first duly sworn, hereby attests as 
follows: 
1. There have been no adverse claims of interest against 
the subject real property (as described in the Complaint), other 
than those asserted by Dean Mackintosh. 
2. On January 1, 1984, Brickyard Office Associates was 
the sole owner of the subject real property in fee simple. 
3. I have reviewed the summary of title transfers described 
in the Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Motion For Summary 
EXHIBIT F 
oooo 
Judgment at page 3. The summary is misleading, incomplete, and 
incorrect. The transfers of title to the subject property since 
1981 were as follows: 
On August 10. 1981. the Brickyard Associates deeded the 
property to Machan-Hampshire Properties. Inc. (Recorded on 
August 27. 1981.) On or about September 22. 1982. Machan-
Hampshire Properties. Inc. deeded the property to MH Properties. 
a Utah general partnership. (Recorded September 24. 1982.) On 
April 6. 1982. 50% of the property was deeded by MH Properties to 
the Gary L. Machan Family Limited Partnership, and 50% to the 
John R. Hampshire Family Limited Partnership. These deeds, 
however, were not recorded until April 13. 1983. In the interim. 
MH Properties deeded a 7% undivided interest in the property to 
Bud Leach on December 29. 1982. which interest was recorded 
December 30. 1982. 
On September 23. 1983, Bud Leach conveyed by warranty 
deed his 7% interest back to Brickyard Office Associates, a Utah 
limited partnership. (Recorded September 28. 1983.) Also on 
September 23, 1983. the Gary L. Machan Family Limited Partnership 
and John R. Hampshire Family Limited Partnership each conveyed by 
warranty deeds a 42 1/2% interest in the property to Brickyard 
Office Associates. (Both deeds recorded September 28. 1983.) On 
October 3, 1983. Brickyard Office Associates conveyed the 
property by warranty deed in trust to Utah Title Company. 
(Recorded October 26. 1983.) Finally, on December 30, 1983. Utah 
Title conveyed the property back to Brickyard Office Associates by 
-2-
warranty deed. 
4. Dean Mackintosh has never been a partner in Brickyard 
Office Associates, or any other general partnership or limited 
partnership with which I have been affiliated which had any 
interest in the subject property, 
5. I have never intended, contemplated or understood that 
Mr. MacKintosh would ever be a partner in Brickyard Office Asso-
ciates, or any other general partnership or limited partnership 
with which I have been affiliated which had any interest in 
the subject property. 
6. The only entities or persons who have ever been general 
partners in Brickyard Office Associates are the John R. Hampshire 
Family Partnership and the Gary L. Machan Family Limited Partner-
ship. The only person who has ever been a limited partner in 
Brickyard Office Associates is Bud Leach. 
7. At no time have I been advised by Mr. Mackintosh as 
to the nature of his alleged interest in the subject real property. 
/ b b jyNfrl V v . ^ Gary £ . \ Machan 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN t o b e f o r e me t h i s P & day o f 
., 1984. 
My Commission Expires: 
0079S/112884 
-r-7 
0»»' .'• ' 
Dale F. Gardiner, 1147 
Daniel L. Berman A0304 
BERMAN & O'RORKE 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1250 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84144 
(801) 328-2200 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
8RICKYARD OFFICE ASSOCIATES ] 
a Utah limited partnership ; 
Plaintiff, j 
v. ; 
DEAN A. MACKINTOSH, ; 
Defendant. ] 
) ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
) MOTION TO BRING IN 
> JOHN R. HAMPSHIRE AND 
> GARY L. MACHON AS THIRD 
) PARTY DEFENDANTS 
i Civil No. C 8 4 - 4 0 6 0 
I Judge Dauid B. Dee 
Defendants Motion for leave to make John R. Hampshire 
and Gary L. Machon parties to the above-entitled action came on 
regularly for hearing before the honorable David 8. Dee, 
District Judge on Friday August 15, 1986 at 11:00 a.m. George 
K. Fadel appeared for the defendant and Dale F. Gardiner, 
Berman & O'Rorke appeared for the plaintiff. The Court having 
considered arguments of counsel, and counsels1 memoranda and 
determined that defendant's Motion failed to comply uiith Rule 
1*, 19, 20 or 22 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
1986 
r.i. ; i , v ft ' A /' 
EXHIBIT G 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED, 
Defendants motion to make John R. Hampshire and Gary 
L. Machon parties to/^W^ action be and is hereby denied. 
DATED: M$lfiTr~^/tf 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
HoncrfaDle Dauid B. Dee 
D i s t r i c t Court Judge. < 
H. D?;-ON HiHDLEY 
»y 
Dar^* 
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